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ABSTRACT
According to social exclusion theory, health risks are positively associated with involuntary social, eco-
nomic, political and cultural exclusion from society. In this paper, a social exclusion framework has been 
used, and available literature on microcredit in Bangladesh has been reviewed to explore the available 
evidence on associations among microcredit, exclusion, and health outcomes. The paper addresses the 
question of whether participation in group-lending reduces health inequities through promoting social 
inclusion. The group-lending model of microcredit is a development intervention in which small-scale 
credit for income-generation activities is provided to groups of individuals who do not have material col-
lateral. The paper outlines four pathways through which microcredit can affect health status: financing 
care in the event of health emergencies; financing health inputs such as improved nutrition; as a platform 
for health education; and by increasing social capital through group meetings and mutual support. For 
many participants, the group-lending model of microcredit can mitigate exclusionary processes and lead 
to improvements in health for some; for others, it can worsen exclusionary processes which contribute to 
health disadvantage.
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INTRODUCTION
According to social exclusion theory, health risks 
are positively associated with involuntary social, 
economic, political and cultural exclusion from 
society. Microcredit is a development intervention 
designed to reduce poverty through access to cred-
it. While not explicitly designed to impact health 
as a poverty reduction strategy, microcredit inter-
ventions have the potential to empower borrowers, 
and through several different pathways, improve 
health. Microcredit programmes have been adapt-
ed to different contexts all over the world, in rich 
and poor countries, with an estimated 92 million 
clients in the developing world (1). The year 2005 
was named the ‘Year of Microcredit’ by the UN’s 
Economic and Social Council. In 2006, Moham-
med Yunus won the Nobel Prize for Peace for his 
work with the Grameen Bank.
We use a social exclusion framework and draw 
on the available literature on microcredit in Ban-
gladesh to explore associations between participa-
tion in microcredit programmes, social exclusion, 
and health status. We begin with a description of 
the multiple exclusionary factors that microcredit 
seeks to combat, specifically poverty, the tradition-
al norms that govern women’s conduct in public, 
and urban-rural inequalities in wealth and develop-
ment. We then explain the group-lending model of 
microcredit, and drawing upon the available evi-
dence, suggest four pathways in which microcredit 
can impact health. Ultimately, we argue that while 
group-based microcredit programmes have the po-
tential to help borrowers raise themselves out of 
poverty, these programmes can also replicate ex-
clusionary processes in society and further health 
inequity.
MICROCREDIT
The microcredit movement in Bangladesh is an 
important story in contemporary development dis-
course, both because of its origins within the coun-
try and because of its reach in the population. The 
agricultural cycle in Bangladesh has always been 
closely tied to the provision of credit. Traditionally, Schurmann AT and Johnston HB Microcredit, exclusion, and health in Bangladesh
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small cultivators relied on money-lenders for agri-
cultural inputs or consumption requirements until 
harvest (2). Provision of formal microcredit, with 
goals of sustainable poverty reduction, began in 
1959 by Akter Hameed Khan in what was called the 
‘Comilla Model’ (after a town by the same name) 
by the Pakistan Rural Development Board (later 
named the Bangladesh Rural Development Board). 
However, this experiment achieved only isolated 
success due to elite capture and a lack of commu-
nity buy-in. Over time, different strategies of mi-
crocredit have been explored, and different finance 
products developed (all under the broader term of 
‘microfinance’). The movement has expanded in 
the last decades; there are now over 1,500 microfi-
nance institutions in Bangladesh (1).
The two primary providers of microcredit in Ban-
gladesh are the Grameen Bank and Building Re-
sources Across Communities (now BRAC, formerly 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), both 
of which started their operations in the late 1970s. 
These organizations work to tie social development 
goals with provision of credit. While BRAC uses 
various interventions to assist the poor and has a 
strong emphasis on consciousness-raising, Gra-
meen Bank’s main focus is microcredit. Grameen 
Bank has over 2,247 branches, covering 72,096 
villages, with a total of four million borrowers, 
and BRAC has an estimated 3.6 million borrowers 
through its 50,000 village organizations (1,3). There 
are a number of different models of microcredit de-
livery; however, both BRAC and Grameen Bank use 
the group-lending model—the model discussed in 
this paper. 
The main attribute of the group-lending model of 
microcredit is the use of social rather than mate-
rial collateral. Loans are made to small groups or 
cooperatives, and peer pressure is used for ensuring 
that repayments are made. In Bangladesh, women 
are  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  microcredit  pro-
grammes—not necessarily out of a feminist im-
pulse but because there is evidence that women are 
more sensitive to peer pressure and so are more re-
liable debtors. In the absence of material collateral 
and credit-rating systems, the group-lending model 
makes use of information ‘impacted’ in the village 
about who is a reliable borrower, and villagers re-
veal such information by using their judgement to 
select fellow debtors for the small groups. In this 
way, the group-based lending model both uses and 
builds upon the social capital of its borrowers. This 
makes group-based lending efficient and effective, 
with low transaction costs for the provider (4,5). 
Any extra income earned through participation 
in a microcredit scheme can be spent on what mi-
crocredit clients (or their households) see as their 
highest priority; so, the intervention can be viewed 
as less paternalistic and more enabling than other 
development interventions (6). 
While microcredit is an indigenous solution to local 
poverty in Bangladesh, many international actors 
were instrumental in its growth and expansion, in-
cluding Chicago’s South Shore Bank, the Ford Foun-
dation, and the World Bank. The many different 
donors have brought different priorities and ideolo-
gies, reporting procedures, and indicators that have 
shaped the practice of microcredit (7). 
EXCLUSION IN BANGLADESH
In this analysis, we explore the available evidence 
on associations between microcredit and exclusion 
and health status. Processes that create inequities 
have traditionally been understood in terms of mar-
ket exploitation, or the extraction of surplus value. 
However, market exploitation alone does not ac-
count for many inequity-producing processes. The 
social processes that ‘shut out’ certain categories 
of people from the benefits of participation could 
better be described as exclusion or social exclusion 
(8). This analysis explores the factors that have tra-
ditionally excluded certain groups from financial 
markets in Bangladesh. The principal factors iden-
tified are poverty (economic exclusion), regional 
disparities (spatial exclusion), and the low-status 
of women (cultural exclusion). This analysis pres-
ents each of these factors in isolation, but in reality, 
these factors compound each other as components 
of deprivation and exclusion and have causal and 
dynamic connections (9). The figure is a concep-
tual model depicting the relationship of social ex-
clusion to poor health outcomes in Bangladesh as 
described in this paper. The model depicts that cul-
tural, spatial and economic exclusions are encom-
passed under the umbrella of ‘social exclusion’.
Economic exclusion
The poverty levels in Bangladesh have always been 
high. Post-independence levels of income poverty 
in Bangladesh in the mid-1970s were estimated at 
70-80%. With rates of economic growth over 5% 
annually, poverty rates in Bangladesh have been 
declining by about 1% a year since the 1990s (10). 
According to the 2005 estimates, the poverty level 
is 40% in urban and 44% in rural Bangladesh. This 
overall decline in poverty masks the concurrent 
increase in income and asset inequality, with rural Schurmann AT and Johnston HB Microcredit, exclusion, and health in Bangladesh
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areas at a particular disadvantage. The Gini coef-
ficient for consumption expenditure for rural areas 
rose from 0.28 in 1991-1992 to 0.31 by 2000. In 
urban areas, it climbed from 0.36 to 0.41 (9). 
The poor are not a homogenous group. While esti-
mates vary, about 10% of the poor can be classified 
as ‘ultra-poor’ as measured by indicators, such as 
low consumption, low height-for-age, no formal 
education, high rates of infant mortality, and lack 
of access to essential services (10). This segment of 
the population is particularly vulnerable to factors 
that will increase deprivation: loss of assets (due 
to flooding for example), health emergencies, un-
stable livelihoods, and poor sanitation. Such chron-
ic insecurity often leads to livelihood strategies that 
prevent mobility out of poverty, such as irregular 
day labour, begging, or sex work (11). 
Spatial exclusion
The rural poor are not only excluded from eco-
nomic growth through lack of financial resources 
and assets but also through their distance from 
opportunities in the urban economy. There is also 
spatial disadvantage within rural areas associated 
with low ‘geographic capital’: uneven distribu-
tion of services and infrastructure, low agricultur-
al or resource potential, and weak economic and 
transport linkages (9,11,12). Data on rural poverty 
levels since 2000 vary from 61% in Rajshahi to 40% 
in Barisal (11). However, the importance of place to 
variation in health is not just a matter of geography 
but also dynamic social and political relationships 
(11,12). For example, particular electorates may be 
favoured as vote-banks during the election cycle. 
Cultural exclusion—purdah
Purdah is a social and Islamic religious tradition 
that prohibits women from mixing with men who 
are not blood relatives, after the onset of menarche. 
Norms vary but generally purdah denies women ac-
cess to productive capital and markets (13); women 
in purdah are not allowed to work, touch money, 
or go to the market. While restrictions are, to an 
extent, negotiable (2), adhering to purdah grants 
status and privilege, and conversely, violating pur-
dah means loss of status and can be a sign of down-
ward economic mobility. Typically, purdah confines 
women’s work to the domestic sphere where it is 
under-valued and not remunerated. For example, 
if women work outside the household during the 
peak agricultural season, they would normally be 
paid in kind, not in cash to avoid violation of pur-
dah (14). Restriction to the domestic sphere limits 
social networks, participation in civil society, and a 
voice in policy dialogue.
TARGETING THE EXCLUDED
In the previous section, barriers to inclusion in 
financial markets are described. Microcredit inter-
ventions need to overcome these barriers to reach 
those in need to be able to claim success. The clien-
tele for microcredit are generally subsistence level, 
economically active, poor rural women. However, 
the programmatic targeting practices vary accord-
ing to the priorities of the lender. If more reliable 
Fig. A conceptual model of differential impact of microcredit on exclusion in Bangladesh 
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debtors are targeted, the transformative potential 
of microcredit to help the poorest is lower, but the 
profitability and sustainability are higher. This sec-
tion describes how microcredit fares in targeting 
those most in need as it balances the contrary im-
peratives of reach and sustainability. 
Targeting the ultra-poor
Borrowers with assets and skills are able to make 
better use of credit and provide lenders with higher 
returns (15). In his study of characteristics of pov-
erty dynamics in Bangladesh, Sen found that rural 
ascendent households had greater access to credit 
than chronically poor and descendent households, 
suggesting that access to financial capital was an im-
portant element in the climb out of poverty (11). 
At the same time, the ultra-poor and descendent 
individuals and households typically face barriers 
to joining traditional microcredit programmes, 
such as lacking the initial endowment (material 
and non-material collateral), high opportunity 
costs, and limited capacity for labour substitution. 
Even when included in microcredit programmes, 
some groups, such as landless casual labourers, 
are less able to benefit because they do not have a 
regular income that would enable them to commit 
to repayments, including interest. A loan for such 
borrowers only means increased insecurity and risk 
(5). It is generally acknowledged that traditional 
group-lending microcredit programmes are not ap-
propriate for the ultra-poor, see for example, the 
World Bank’s Consultative Group’s ‘Key Principles’ 
(16). By benefiting only the marginally poor, mi-
crocredit can further isolate the ultra-poor by in-
creasing inequality. 
In response to this, BRAC has developed a pro-
gramme specifically to target the ultra-poor with 
the aim of enabling them to gain the resources nec-
essary to gainfully participate in traditional micro-
credit programmes (17). When the ultra-poor are 
specifically targeted as clients, conditionalities are 
often more generous; for example, the loans may 
be small with no interest and no repayment time-
frame (17). 
Targetting rural areas
Microcredit programmes in Bangladesh have gene-
rally concentrated in rural areas and have achieved 
many successes. However, as mentioned earlier, 
Bangladesh has many rural areas that are vulnera-
ble to flooding, have poor transport infrastructure, 
and are otherwise economically less viable. As pro-
grammatic sustainability is more difficult in such 
areas (18,42), these are less attractive to microcre-
dit programme implementers and are avoided. 
Residents of areas with low geographic capital still 
face barriers to accessing financial markets (18).
Targeting women
Targeting is also gendered since microcredit gene-
rally focuses on women as efficient agents for the 
welfare of the household and as low-risk borrowers. 
Women present less credit risks, with default rates 
of only 3% compared to 10% for men (19). As debt-
ors, women are seen as more passive, submissive, 
and vulnerable, making them more liable to make 
repayments (18). Repayments and debt collection 
can put significant pressure on women because 
they do not necessarily directly control household 
resources (20). While the burden of repayments are 
borne by women, the loan itself and income from 
microenterprise are often passed onto husbands or 
sons (21). This means that the ability of microcredit 
to empower women cannot be measured through 
client lists or timely repayments. Kabeer, instead, 
suggests that the measurement of empowerment 
needs to be within the local context, taking into 
account the perceptions of the beneficiaries them-
selves (2). Of course, impact is unlikely to be even. 
Women are not a homogenous group, and their 
contexts differ. Different individuals in different 
situations are likely to take advantage of different 
opportunities in different ways, or not at all. As 
previously mentioned, those with assets and skills, 
those closer to towns with access to opportunities 
for commerce, and those with more support from 
their families are more likely to benefit from mi-
crocredit.
To participate in microcredit activities, women 
must negotiate purdah barriers and balance micro-
credit obligations with childcare, subsistence, and 
other domestic duties. Compared to entry into the 
formal labour sector (e.g. a job in a garment fac-
tory), microcredit is easier to accommodate with 
purdah restrictions and household and childcare 
commitments. Thus, microcredit can serve as an 
intervention to assist women and households in 
the transition from the declining agricultural sec-
tor into the formal sector.
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND  
SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Through regular group meetings, group-based 
lending models of microfinance programming 
can develop new social capital and networks for 
participants. The mutual support and solidarity of Schurmann AT and Johnston HB Microcredit, exclusion, and health in Bangladesh
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the group provides an atmosphere of collective self- 
interest (4). As a result, those who traditionally have 
been marginalized may become more organized 
and gain a stronger voice, which can lead to higher 
levels of political awareness and participation (2). 
However, the transformative potential of enhanced 
social capital should not be overstated. Success of 
microfinance depends on peer pressure (social col-
lateral) as a substitute for material collateral and in-
surance against late or non-payment. Peer pressure, 
in turn, depends on membership to the group, or 
social inclusion. Peer pressure is used both as a disci-
plinary and support mechanism within microcred-
it, and the balance between these two functions is 
a fine one. Goetz finds that the emphasis on peer 
pressure as a disciplinary force in BRAC microcredit 
groups has undermined trust and support and in-
creases the likelihood that the poor and most vul-
nerable will be excluded (20). People who lapse on 
their payments are punished with reclamation of 
their assets but, more importantly, non-payment 
results in social sanction.
In an ethnographic study, Todd provides a further 
account of social relationships within microcredit 
programmes (22). Todd found that group solidarity 
is tenuous and does not usurp or disrupt traditional 
kin or patron-client networks, where stronger loy-
alties tend to reside. Indeed, such relationships are 
key to women’s survival and success in microcre-
dit programmes. Todd points out “these (kin and 
patron-client) relationships are vital to women 
because they are dependent, but they can also be 
used to negotiate their independence.” Todd also 
reports that successful members of credit groups are 
highly intolerant of less successful group members, 
even when the lack of success was clearly not their 
fault. Failure to meet group norms can lead to so-
cial exclusion (22). 
While microcredit counters the exclusion of the 
poor from access to formal lending, it does not cater 
to those who are subjected to high levels of exclu-
sion. The logic of relying on social collateral rather 
than material collateral inherently means that there 
will always be some who are excluded (for example, 
widows, migrant labourers, single mothers, people 
with stigmatizing illnesses). Inequalities in social 
collateral lead to unequal access to microcredit and 
its potential benefits (8,21). Unfortunately, women 
are not judged on their own merit alone, but often 
risk being denied participation in lending groups if 
their husbands drink or gamble, or otherwise pose 
a credit risk (18,21). In these instances, microcredit 
reinforces existing social processes of exclusion (8). 
MICROCREDIT, MEASUREMENT,  
AND HEALTH STATUS
Participation in microcredit programmes is associ-
ated with positive health behaviours and outcomes 
in numerous studies (Table) (for a meta-analysis, 
see also Morduch J, 2001). However, these data 
need to be viewed with some caution. The social-
ly-embedded nature of microcredit group makes 
causality difficult to prove (7,23). Membership in 
credit groups depends and builds on social capi-
tal, which may itself be correlated with education 
and healthcare-seeking behaviours. Women who 
join microcredit programmes likely have access 
to more social capital from the outset. This point 
is demonstrated by Steele et al. (1998), who used 
a quasi-experimental panel design to identify the 
characteristics of women who chose to join mi-
crocredit programmes (21,24). They found that the 
women who joined were relatively educated and 
socially independent compared to those who did 
not join. However, after controlling for this selec-
tion bias, they still identified a positive impact with 
regard to children’s education, age at marriage, and 
use of modern contraception. On the other hand, 
Mahmud suggests that selection bias goes the other 
way, with the least empowered women being the 
most likely clients of microcredit (24). Either way, 
selection bias provides a hurdle to proving causal-
ity, even with multivariate analysis. One must con-
sider that microcredit may only help those who are 
already economically ascendant. 
Similarly, the pathways from microcredit to health 
are not always explicit. This analysis draws on the 
literature to suggest four broad pathways in which 
microcredit could have a positive impact. For the 
purpose of this analysis, these are presented as 
unique pathways. In reality, the pathways cross 
and intermingle, their individual impact difficult 
to tease out. 
First, microcredit serves as a medium to communi-
cate health messages. When borrowers participate 
in regular repayment meetings, they may be (de-
pending on the programme) provided with health 
education or service provision, increasing their 
knowledge of and access to formal healthcare. The 
regular meetings associated with the group-based 
lending models of microfinance programming 
provide a forum for education and training. BRAC 
programmes, more often than Grameen Bank, 
capitalize on this opportunity to provide regular 
contact with a health educator. Grameen Kalyan 
(the healthcare arm of Grameen Bank) now pro-
vides primary healthcare services in operational Schurmann AT and Johnston HB Microcredit, exclusion, and health in Bangladesh
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areas and ancillary health services, such as health 
insurance (25). Providing learning opportunities 
alongside credit is not just altruism on the part of 
the lender; increasing general capacity of the poor 
cultivates more capable clients (4). Ill-health is the 
most common reason for loan defaulting, which 
benefits neither the lender nor the borrower. Micro-
credit participants are likely to be influential within 
their social network due to their upward mobility 
(typical ‘innovators’), and new health knowledge 
and behaviours are likely to diffuse quickly from 
group participants to the rest of the community 
(26). 
Second, microcredit can improve the general quali-
ty of life of borrowers by increasing disposable in-
come, reducing vulnerability through diversifying 
income sources, strengthening financial shock-cop-
ing mechanisms (insurance, savings), and building 
assets. A large literature demonstrates the bi-direc-
tional relationships between health and economic 
status (27). Nanda documented that income from 
microcredit increased women’s perceived and ac-
tual contribution to the household. This resulted 
in a positive impact on their decisions to seek quali- 
ty healthcare (28). Evidence has also shown that 
women are more likely than men to spend earned 
income to benefit the entire household on items, 
such as food, education, and asset building (29). 
Pitt et al. found that access of women to credit 
from group-based credit programmes had a large 
and statistically significant effect on the health of 
both boy and girl children whereas access of men 
to credit had no effect (30). There is also evidence 
that increased income for women improves child 
and maternal health through increased school at-
tendance and increased contraceptive use (Table). 
Third, availability of credit can assist the poor with 
financing  health  emergencies,  such  as  ill-health 
of  the  main  breadwinner.  The  main  difference 
from the point above is the immediacy of a need 
to finance a curative health emergency as opposed 
to a slower process of building a healthier and 
more  secure  household.  Health  emergencies  are 
strongly related to impoverishment in Bangladesh. 
Costs of treatment and medicines can easily con-
sume an entire household budget, especially if the 
household members do not have a regular source 
of  income.  Sale  of  productive  assets  to  pay  for 
healthcare often leads households into downward 
trajectories, pushing families into the category of 
‘ultra-poor’ (8,31).
The final pathway is building social capital through 
group meetings and mutual support, which has 
been demonstrated to improve health in and of it-
self (32). The social interaction in the group meet-
ings has been found to play an important role in 
the diffusion of innovative behaviours such as con-
traceptive-use (23). However, as Portes has pointed 
out, social capital can equally function in both an 
exclusive or inclusive way—with positive welfare 
effects from some and negative for others (33,34). 
This paper suggests that this is the likely outcome 
of group-based lending interventions; with eco-
nomic and social benefits for those included within 
the lending group, and a denial of benefits to those 
purposefully excluded from the group. In this way, 
the mechanisms of group closure are re-aligned ac-
cording to group credit membership (23). However, 
the impact of exclusion from microcredit on health 
requires further study as most studies compare mi-
crocredit participants to a control group, not to 
those who were excluded from joining a micro-
credit group.
DISCUSSION
A substantial body of literature about microcredit 
in Bangladesh shows that participation in a mi-
crocredit programme is associated with improved 
health behaviours and outcomes. Using social ex-
clusion theory and drawing upon the literature 
around social capital, this analysis unpacks the rela-
tionships between microcredit and health, suggest-
ing that microcredit has the potential to improve 
the health of participants. However, typical of 
a market-based solution, it is not equitable. By 
excluding individuals through the social processes 
of group formation, individuals and households 
are also excluded from the compounded benefits 
of microcredit, including the social support it en-
genders (Fig.). In this way, it replaces the economic 
exclusions of the market with exclusion through 
social processes. For this reason, it cannot be relied 
upon to ensure health equity. 
Social  exclusion  analysis  helps  reveal  the  exclu-
sions  perpetuated  by  microcredit.  While  it  can 
be an effective and transformative intervention, it 
should not be implemented at the expense of oth-
er interventions, such as infrastructure projects, 
service provision, or targeted subsidies. It cannot 
replace a vibrant public sector in providing capa-
bilities to the poor for development. However, 
this article does not suggest a rejection of market-
based  solutions  to  poverty  and  health  inequity. 
This article argues that complementary interven-
tions are needed to buffer exclusionary impacts of 
microcredit.Schurmann AT and Johnston HB Microcredit, exclusion, and health in Bangladesh
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Table. Microcredit and health in Bangladesh: an overview of the evidence
Topical area Association with health  Study design Author and year
Access to care Use of private doctor 
and pharmacy: 15.4% in 
intervention area and 11% 
in control area; knowledge of 
government gynaecological 
doctor: 60% in intervention 
area and 8% in control area
3 household surveys:
1992 (n=656),
1997 (n=2,105–intervention;  
n=1,721–control) and 1998
(n=1,068–intervention; 
n=700–control group)
Amin et al., 2001 
(35)
Access to care Women’s involvement in 
credit programmes increased 
the likelihood that curative 
care was accessed; involvement 
in IGAs decreased likelihood 
Household wealth decreased 
likelihood of child 
experiencing illness episode  
Travel time negatively 
associated with use of care 
provider
1997 cross-sectional household 
survey (n=2,304) in two 
regions
Levin et al., 2001 
(36)
Access to care Participation in microcredit 
programme has a positive 
significant effect on level of 
health knowledge
Cross-sectional household 
survey (n=1,798) in 87 
randomly-sampled districts 
Controls for endogeneity 
with a weighted 2-stage 
instrumental variable—land 
ownership
Nanda, 1998 (28)
Acute 
respiratory 
infections 
(health 
knowledge)
34.4% of mothers in the 
intervention site were aware 
of all symptoms of ARI, and 
30.7% knew 2+ preventative 
measures; 15.8% of women 
were aware of all symptoms in 
control group and 15.8% knew 
2+ preventative measures
Cross-sectional survey 
(n=2,814) in 200 randomly- 
selected villages
Hadi, 2002 (37)
Child survival 52% reduction in baseline 
level of infant mortality 
for intervention mothers 
compared to a 31% reduction 
in child mortality for control 
group. There was also a 
reduction in child mortality for   
children aged 1-4 year(s), but 
with little difference between 
the intervention and the 
control group
Quasi-experimental. DSS 
survey data, membership 
records of BRAC 
(n=13,549)
Bhuiya et al., 
2002 (38)
Domestic 
violence
Credit programmes reduce 
vulnerability of women to 
domestic violence
Ethnographic study 
(participant-observation, 
in-depth interviews)
Schuler et al., 
1996 (39) 
Contd.Schurmann AT and Johnston HB Microcredit, exclusion, and health in Bangladesh
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Table—Contd.
Domestic 
violence
Membership to microcredit 
programmes can both prevent 
and exacerbate domestic 
violence
Ethnographic study 
(participant-observation, in-
depth interviews)
Schuler et al., 
1998 (13)
Family 
planning
59% of Grameen Bank 
members using contraceptive 
as opposed to 43% in matched 
control group
Quasi-experimental panel 
design
Schuler et al., 
1994 (40) 
Family 
planning
Participation in rural income- 
generating projects increased 
contraceptive-use and a 
decreased desire for additional 
children
Random cluster sample cross-
sectional household survey 
Intervention group: n=2,285; 
control group: n=1,168
Amin et al., 1994 
(14) 
Family 
planning
Association between 
programme membership 
and contraceptive-use, desire 
for smaller families. Also an 
association between these 
factors and living in the 
programme area
1995 cross-sectional household 
survey in 5 regions
Amin et al., 1996 
(41)
Family 
planning
36.2% contraceptive-use in 
intervention area compared to 
13.7%  in control area
Pre- and post-test control
panel survey
1993 (n=6,456) and 1995 
(n=5,696)
cluster sampling
Steele et al. 2001 
(42) 
Maternal 
health
Membership in Grameen 
Bank or BRAC per se has 
no significant effect on any 
contraceptive and reproductive 
behaviour indicators. However, 
the longer a woman is a 
member of an NGO credit 
programme, the more likely 
she is to use a temporary 
or permanent method of 
contraception, even after 
controlling other variables 
Randomized control design, 
survey
Meekers et al., 
1992 (43)
Nutrition 10% increase in credit 
increases arm circumference of 
daughters by 6.3%. There is a 
smaller effect on sons 
Multi-purpose quasi-
experimental household 
survey, cluster sampled, 
conducted in 87 villages of 29 
upazilas, 
1,538 eligible samples
Pitt et al., 2003 
(30)
Health 
knowledge
Microcredit membership and 
participation in health forum 
are associated with a higher 
knowledge of prenatal and 
postnatal care
Causal relationship cannot be 
established
Survey (n=500) Hadi 2001 (44)
ARI=Acute respiratory infection; DSS=Demographic surveillance system; NGO=Non-governmental 
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, we sought to answer whether partici-
pation in group-lending reduces health inequities 
by addressing social exclusion. We applied a social 
exclusion framework to the available research on 
microcredit in Bangladesh. We described the exclu-
sionary factors that microcredit attempts to com-
bat, specifically poverty, the traditional norms that 
govern the conduct of women in public and urban-
rural inequalities in wealth and development; we 
then suggest four pathways in which microcredit 
affects health. Ultimately, we argued that improv-
ing health is one of the most unambiguous benefits 
of microcredit in Bangladesh. However, microcredit 
is not an inclusive approach and for this reason is 
best accompanied with other complementary in-
terventions. 
Our analysis of microcredit, exclusion, and health 
is exploratory in nature. The analysis evaluates the 
impact of microcredit, a poverty-reduction strategy, 
on health outcomes, while health is not necessari-
ly planned for in the design of the microcredit 
programme. None of the studies drawn on for this 
analysis were designed to inform a social exclusion 
analysis. More research into these relationships is 
required. Such research will be useful for the con-
tinued critique and modification of microcredit 
in designing new interventions for capability en-
hancement inclusive of social development and for 
greater health equity. 
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